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ED CASSITY,

Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 8794

J. J. CASTAGNO,
Defendant and Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT
RESPONDENT'S S,UPPLEMENTAL
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Special Interrogatories and Verdict Thereon.
The clerk of the trial court failed to include in the
Record of Appeal, the special interrogatories propounded
by the trial court to the jury, and the answers of the
jury thereto. However, Appellant in his brief, at pages
4, 5 and 6, has correctly t:t·anscribed and set forth said
interrogatories and answers. Notwithstanding the fact
that the original interrogatories and answers are not
included in the Record of Appeal, the Respondent hereby
approves of the action of Appellant in including the
same in his brief, and does hereby adopt such action in
lieu of the inclusion in the Record of Appeal of the
original interrogatories and answers.
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2. Plaintiff's Exhibit I.
Attention is particularly invited to "P Ex I," which
is a map upon which is delineated the respective ownerships of land of Appellant and Respondent involved in
this action. The holdings of Respondent in this area
\vhich are of particular concern are as follows:
(a) The "Exchange property" acquired by Respondent by Patent, dated Dec. 30, 1953, from the
United States of America, and delineated upon
said exhibit in pink, bearing the numeral '5";
(b)

~rhe

"Homestead property" acquired b~~ Respondent by Patent, dated February 6, 1939,
from the l~nited States of America, and delineated upon said exhibit in pink, bearing the
numeral "3."

Upon "P Ex I" is sho'vn a lead pencil line comInencing on the North boundary line of Section 23, Town~ hip :2 South, Range 5 East, Salt Lake :Jieridian, and
extending in a X orth,Yesterly direction across the ••Exchang-e ~~ property and ~·Hoinestead .. property of Re~pondPnt and thence continuing in a X orfu,yesterly
direetion to Stansbury Island. This lead pencil1narking
rPprP~<'ltb~ t IH\ so-called ~·Trail"Tay .. elai1ned by Appellant. It \YH~ placed upon .. p Ex I'~ by the . .\ppellant
nt thP trial ~B. 67, ()~~ G9~ 70).

.

)

.).

~"'yupplcnlcllfal

Eridcnc'c

F,or <'OllY<\niPnC{\ l~t'~lHHldent has included in the
: 1rgnnH'ntativP port ion of this brief such supple1nental
P\·idPlH'e a~ lH\ d<'{'l\18 neee~sn.ry for a proper deterininaf

ion of

thi~ ea~t:'.
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Part A
RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT AND

DEMONS'TRATION OF VALIDITY OF JUDGMENT
POINT I.
WITH RESPECT TO THE LAND ACQUIRED BY DEFENDANT FROl\1 THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BY
PATENT DATED DECEMBER 30, 1953, AND RECORDED
IN THE OFFICE OF THE COUNTY RECORDER OF TOOELE
COUNTY ON FEBRUARY 15, 1954, IN BOOK 4 F OF DEEDS
AT PAGE 229, THE PLAINTIFF HAS ACQUIRED NO TRAILWAY EASEMENT OVER SAME IN SPITE OF THE FINDINGS THAT THE PLAINTIFF AND HIS PREDECESSORS
IN INTEREST HAD TRAILED CATTLE OVER AND ACROSS
THE SAME FOR A PERIOD OF TWENTY YEARS PRIOR
TO MAY 3, 1955, AND NEITHER DOES ANY PUBLIC
HIGHWAY OR ROAD EXIST OVER DEFENDANT'S SAID
LANDS.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Defendant acquired the fee simple title to land delineated as "Pink 5" on Exhibit 1 by virtue of the Federal
patent above described on Dec. 30, 1953 (R. 118). This
land is particularly described as:
W¥2 SWlM and SElM SWl;i, Sec. 4, Lots 6,
7, EY;z SWlM, Sec. 6, NWl;i, SE1;4, W¥2 NE 14,
SEl;i NEl;i, Sec. 9, SWlM SE 14, NW%: SW%:,
Sec. 10; NW1;4, NWl;i NE 14, N¥2 SW 14, SW~4
SvV%:, Sec. 15; NW 14 NW%: Sec. 15; NW 1;4
NW1;4, Sec. 22.
(All of the foregoing is situate in Twp. 2
South, Range 5 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian).
SE%, Sec. 1, Twp. 2 South, Range 6 West,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
Prior to the date of the patent the lands described therein
were public domain owned by the United States of
America. The so-called trailway to and from Stansbury
1.

3
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Island passes over and .across the land above described
located in Twp. 2 South, Range 5 West, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian, with a compass direction from approximately the southeast to the northwest. The plaintiff definitely marked this position of this trailway on
P Ex. I and there is evidence that the trallway deviated
from this course (R. 95).
Plaintiff's evidence was directed towards establishing a private trailway easement. It was intended to
support the allegations of plaintiff's supplemental complaint which claimed a private prescriptive easement
over defendant's lands as appurtenant to plaintiff's
lands. It is alleged:
"Plaintiff's cattle have during said period of
time trailed and crossed back and forth from the
approximately 5,700 acres of land zchich plaintiff
ozcns in said Tou·nship :2 South. Range 3 West,
to his other grazing lands located upon Stansbury
Island and said use in crossing. trailing and nloving ahnost continually over and across the land'3
by plaintiff and his predecessors in interest has
hec n oJ)(! n. under an ad re rse cla iJn of right. knozrn
and acquiesced iu by defendant and l1is predecessors in interest. and has created by prescriptiou an cascnH'nt orer and across all of said lands
u·ithiu the al>orc dcscr1~bed area lrhiclz are not
o1rucd b,11 ~J!aintiff. and 1chich e(~senzent ha~ b.e~
('OIIlt and 1s uou· the property rzght of plauzhf1
in n nd to n11 8nid port ions of land. That all of
~n id u~t\ hY plaintiff and his predecessors in interP~ t, ha rc· i)(·c u an ad ve rsc use 1nad e zcith knowl(\dg·(\ nt a 11 t inll\8 of the o\\-ner of said lands
an~i ''"itltont thPir eon8t::"'nt and.per1nission to said
tt~t lu\in~ tnade. ~~ ( lTnderscoring supplied) (Part I
of plnin1 iff's First Cross Claim and Counterelnint)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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There is no allegation in the Supplemental Complaint and no evidence in the record which even suggests
that plaintiff claimed that a public road existed over
defendant's lands prior to the date of patent thereof
in 1953. Plaintiff claimed by the allegations of his Supplemental Complaint and his evidence was given to prove
a private easement - not the existence of a public road.
There was no interrogatory propounded to the jury concerning the existence of a public road or highway. The
pertinent interrogatories are:
"9. Do you find by a preponderance of the
evidence that the plaintiff and his predecessors
in ownership and possession drove or trailed their
cattle across defendant's lands in going to and
frorn Stansbury Island 1 (Answer yes or no).
Answer: 'Yes.'
"10. If your answer to No. 9 is yes, answer
the following questions:
A. Prior to May 3, 1955, did the plaintiff
and his predecessors in ownership and
possession regularly use the defendant's
lands for that purpose for 20 consecutive
years 1 (Answer yes or no).
Answer: 'Yes.'
B. Did the trail, if any, follow the same general course and direction during the 20
year period referred to in the next preceding question 1
Answer : 'Yes.' "
The Court followed the theory of plaintiff's supplemental complaint and of plaintiff's evidence in propounding these interrogatories, and submitted to the
jury questions which pertained to facts relevant only
to the question whether a private prescriptive trailway

5
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easement appurtenant to plaintiff's lands as the dominant tenement, had come into existence. There was no
finding as to the existence of a pre-patent public high'vay or road over defendant's lands and neither did the
Court ask for any such finding for two valid reasons:
(a) plaintiff's supplemental complaint alleged no facts
upon which such claim could be based, and (b) there
is no evidence in the record supporting such claim.
2. CITATION OF A17THORITIES .
. .\. Pri'Gate, prescripti1;e right in the Public
Domain.
"It is conceded that title to . .\ppellants' land
remained in the Lnited States until December,
1891. * * * This court has repeatedly held that
a prescriptive right in, to and over real estate
ean be acquired only after an open, continuous
and adverse user for a period of 20 years. * * ~
It follo"~s therefore that the time at which the
ref'pondents alleged preseripti\e right commenced
'Yas in Dece1nber 1891. This falls far short of
the period of tune required to entitle respondent to a right of 'vay over appellants' land by
pre~cription, and he n1ust therefore fail upon
thi~ ground:~ (Lund YS. ,,~ilcox, 34 l~tah 203 ~
"")
.<)-' .I~ ae. ,),)
"'Vhil(\ there is no t~Yidence in the record
~1un,·ing- "·hen the patent "·as issued by the l~nited
~tah'~ in "·hon1 the original title "\Yas yested to
rP~pondent'~ land. yt"\t their counsel in their briet
in rPferring' to this subjeet at page 13. says:
.ri,IH\ :\lnrphy~ ( rt"\~lHHldents) land "·as patented
in lS7 -t.' 'rt' n~~tnne this to be the fact. If~ therefor<\ no tit h' pn~~t'd fro1n tht. . goyerninent of the

rniff'd ~tnt<'~ to that of priYate 0\Yllership in
th<' \"(':1 r 1S74, tht' right to arquire a. priYate easena\n.t h~r ll~t"\r or pre~~ription dates fro1n that
6
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year. * * * If, therefore, we begin with the year
1875 the twenty year period would end with the
beginning of the year 1895." (Bolton v. Murphy,
41 Utah 591; 127 Pac. 335)
''It may be conceded that plaintiff is supported by the authorities in his contention that
an easement by prescription cannot be acquired
over land belonging to the State or the United
States, (10 C.J. Sees. 23, 24, pg. 876). Such has
been declared to be the law of this jurisdiction
as applied to land belonging to the United States.
(Bolton v. Murphy supra, Lund v. Wilcox supra).
The title to a part of plaintiff's land over which
the defendants clain1 the right to convey the
\Yater with which to irrigate their land was conveyed by the United States to E. W. Tripp, the
predecessor of the plaintiff, in 1899. The title
to the other land over \vhich the defendants clain1
such right was conveyed by the State of Utah
in 1913. It will be thus seen that, if there was a
break in defendants' use of the irrigating ditches
ayross plaintiffs' land from 1907 to 1917 the defendants could not acquire an easement by prescription across plaintiffs' land because there
could not be a continuous use for a period of
20 years. As to the land conveyed to plaintiff
by the State of Utah in 1913, obviously a prescriptive easement could not be acquired up to
1922 when this suit was begun." (Tripp v. Bagley,
74 Utah 57,276 Pac. 912; 69 ALR 1417).
"It is well established as the rule in Utah
that the prescriptive period is twenty years as
it was at the common law (citing Utah Supren1e
Court decision.) (Savage v. Nielsen, 114 Utah
22; 197 Pac. (2d) 117 at 122).

B. Highways Over Public Lands.
"The right of way for the construction of
highways over public lands, not reserved for pub
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lie use, is hereby granted." (USRS 2477; 43 USCA
Sec. 932).
"llighways are distinguished from private
roads or ways in that the former are intended
for the use of the public generally and are maintained at public expense, as already noted, while
the latter are intended for the exclusive use and
benefit of particular persons. -Giving a private
\\·ay a name does not make it a public highway
or thoroufare." (25 Am. Jur., Highways, Sec.
4, pg. 340)
.. rrhe term ~high,Yay' is, however~ used in both
a broad and narrow sense. In its broad or general
~en~e, it covers every common "~ay for travel in
any ordinary mode or by any ordinary means
\\?hich the public has the right to use conditionally
or unconditionally. * * * In a limited sense, however, the ter1n 1neans a "Tay for general travel
\\?hich is \\Tholly public. When appearing in a
general la\Y- it will ordinarily be regarded as
haYing been used by the legislature in its general
sen~e. * * :~~:q (~5 _ .:\.Jn. Jur .. Highways. Sec. 3,
pg. 3-tl)

"if a 1ray is one orer 1rhich tlze public hare
right of passage. it is in legal contemplation a hiplucay, \vhether it be one owned by
n priYate corporation or one o""'D.ed by the governlltPnt nr a goYPrninentnl corporation, and "~hether
it he ~ituated in a to\\~ or in the country. Xo
llHltter "·hether it be e~tablished by prescription
n r hv d Pd i en t ion~ or under the rights of e1ninent
doJn;lin_ it is a higlura_11 if there is a geueral right
to ''-"(' it for trarcl. 7'he n1odc of its creation does
uof of if."'t'lf iurariab/.11 detcrtniue its character:
(or this iu pcucra!. ;,. .- dcter1nined by the riglds
·~~·hi<·h the publi(' hare iu 1"'t. (lTnderscoring suppliPd) (l~lliott~ R,ond8 and Streets. \-.-ol. l_ Ser.
:1~ P~· --t-).
a. ,r1c ne ral
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"In order to constitute a particular road or
highway a public road and the traffic and travel
thereon subject to regulation and control by the
Commission the question is not whether the county
or state has acquired an indefeasible title, easement, or right of way, but the question is whether
the particular road or highway is being used by
the public generally for travel and traffic and is
claimed by the public as a public road or highway, and as such is being used for the purpose
of hauling and transporting freight and passengers over it for hire or private gain by those
owning and using the ordinary and usual vehicles
used on public highways for such purpose. Any
road or highway which i's thus being used by the
public generally is, in my judgment, a public
road or highway within the purview of the lavv,
over which the travel and traffic is subject to
regulation by the Commission. (Emphasis supplied.) (Justice Frick in Public Utilities Commission v. Jones, 54 Utah 111, 179 Pac. 745)
"The term 'public highway' in its broad,
popular sense includes toll roads, - any road
which the public have a right to use even conditionally, though in a strict legal sense, it is
restricted to roads which are wholly public."
(Weirick vs. State, 140 Wis. 98, 121 NW 652,
22 LRA (N.S.) 1221)
"The word 'highway' as ordinarily used
means a way over land open to the use of the
general public without unreasonable distinction
or discrimination, established in a rnode by the
laws of the State where located." (Lovelace v.
Hightower, 50 N.M. 50; 168 Pac. (2nd) 50).
"The federal statute involved is as follows:
'The right of way for the construction of highways over public lands, not reserved for public
uses is hereby granted.' This is an offer to dedj9
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cate any unreserved public lands for the construction of highways to become effective * * *.
It is a general rule that acceptance of an offered
dedication of land for a highway may be established h~.r proof of affirmative acts of taking pos.
S(~ssion by public authorities or by general use
hy the public, provided the use is sufficient to
constitute acceptance. (Citing authorities). The
Supreme Court of the "C"nited States has said
that such uses 'ought to be for such length of
time that the public accommodation and private
rights might be materially affected by an interruption of the enjoyment.' " (City of Cincinnati
vs. \Y.hite's Lessee, 6 Pet. ±31, 8 L.Ed. 452. * * *.
''The United States as a land owner has
n1ade an offer to dedicate unappropriated land for
hig]T\\Tays~ if accepted as authorized by this state's
la"T· 'rhe ease1nent for its use as a public highway
"Tas created exactly as those (of "\Yhich) the dedicator "Tas an individual land owner. If mere public user is sufficient acceptance of an offered
dedication, the ten year statute of limitations
i~ not ren1otely applicable. * * * The courts of
a 1najorit~T of the states "\vhich ha\e had the
quP~tion for consideration ha\e held that the
g·pneral rules applies to the offered dedication of
higlny·a~-~ under the Federal statute involved here.
( ( 'iiting anthoritit•s) (Lovelace Y. Highto"\Yer.
~upra)

'"11 hP <':.1 n~e of action upon "\Yhich plaintiff
pr<\Ya i 1(\d herein upon a finding that the road is
a puhlir high"\Ya~T "-a~ not the sa1ne cause of action
as tiH• niH~ in the for1ner aetion "Thich alleged his
o\rlll'r~hip of a private right of "\Yay. The proof
Ihat 11·ould hare cstabli.-..'hed one cause of action
U'OIIld uof hare established the other. The causes
ol actiou u·crc iu fact inconsistent. since defenda.ul cou1d not ha rc <-.,'old and plat~ntiff could not

hare purchased. a prirate right of 1cay orer a
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public road. Moreover, a different title was involved in each case, the first a private title, and
the other a title vested in the public. * * * The
question of the public character of the road was
not in issue in the first case and the issue \vas
not tried. A decision either \vay as to the private
right clailned would not have determined any
question as to the public right." (E1nphasis supplied) (Ball v. Stephens, 68 Cal. App. 843, 158
Pac. (2nd) 207).

"The grant (R.S. 2477, 43 flT.S. CA 932,
supra) is unconditional and contains no provision
as to the Inanner of its acceptance. We think it
quite well settled that when land is granted for
a right of way for a public high,vay, the grant
may be accepted by the public without action by
the public authorities. The continued use of the
road by the public for such length of time and
under such circu1nstances as to clearly indicate
an intention on the part of the public to accept
the grant has generally been held sufficient more
especially so if it is made to appear that to interrupt the use would "inconvenience the public.''
It must be born in mind that it is not a question
of the establishment of a highway by prescription
which is here in question, b~d the acceptance of a
grant; and therefore it does not depend so much
on a definite length of time of use as upon the
character of the use, taking into account the needs
and convenience of the public) as manifesting an
intention to accept the grant. (Emphasis supplied) (Hatch Bros. Co. v. Black, 25 Wyo. 109,
165 Pac. 518) (Cf: on rehearing, 25 Wyo. 416,
171 Pac. 267)
"A highway is a way open to the puhlic at
large, for travel or transportation, without distinction, discrimination or restriction, except such
as is incident to regulations calculated to secure
to the general public the largest practical benefit
11
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therefrom and enjoyment thereof. Its prime essentials are the r_ight of common enjoyment on
the one hand and the duty of public maintenance
on the other. It is the right of travel by all the
world, and not the exercise of the right, which
constitutes a way, a public highway, and the actual
amount of travel upon it is not material. If it is
open to all who desire to use it it is a public
highway although it may accomodate only a limited portion of the public or even a single family,
and although it accommodates some individuals
nlore than others." (Emphasis supplied) (25
An1. Jur. Highways- Sec. 2, Pgs. 339, 340)
Lindsay Land & Livestock Co. v. Churnes, 75
Utah 384, 285 Pac. 646
Sullivan v. Condas, 76 l~tah 585, 290 Pac. 954
.J erem~- v. Bertagnole, 101 Utah 1, 116 Pac. (2nd)
420
O.S.L. Rd. ( o. vs. ~Iurray City. ~ l~tah (2nd)
427, 277 Pac. (2nd) 798
Leach v. :Jfanhart 102 Colo. 129. 77 Pac. (2nd)
652
1

"C se under private right is not sufficient. If
the thoroughfare is laid out or used as a private
"-ay. its use. ho"-eYer long as a pri,ate 'va:~ does
not 111ake it a public 'yay. l"T se under private use
i~ not sufficient * • • and the 1nere fact that
the public n1ake use of it ,,-ithout objection fron1
the (l\Yner of the land "-ill not 1nake it a public.
\Ya~". Before it beco1nes public in character th0
o\\·npr of th~ land n1ust eonsent to the change.
( l\1 orri~ v. Blunt. 49 l~tah ~-l-~i. 1()1 Par. 1127)

3. AR.O{Tl\1 ]~~N'r
. \. J~ri rate J> rci'\cripticc R iphts on Pub !i.e
])()JJIOiJl

ThP nncon troYPrtPd facts in this case absolutely
deny plaintiff an~· priYate traih,·ay ease1nent over~ upon
1~
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or across lands of defendant above described. Any use
of these lands by plaintiff and predecessors in title while
the lands were part of the public don1ain cannot, of
course, be considered in deter1nining the existence of a
private prescriptive right. (See authorities cited above.)
Plaintiff commenced the present action on May 28, 1955,
by filing his complaint in the office of the Clerk of the
Court. He served and filed his answer to defendant's
cross complaint and his supplemental complaint setting
up his alleged private prescriptive right to a trailway
easement over said lands on January 6, 1956. The Federal patent is dated Dec. 30, 1953, and was recorded Feb.
15, 1954 (R. 118). If plaintiff is allowed the benefit of
the January 6, 1956 date (date of filing his supplemental complaint) instead of May 28, 1955 (date of filing
his original complaint), the expired time after issuance of
Federal patent during which plaintiff used defendant's
said lands is not more than 1 year, 10 months and 21 days
(time between date of recording patent-Feb. 15, 1954and date of filing supplemental complaint-January 6,
1956). If the period is computed from date of Federal
patent (Dec. 30, 1953) to date of filing supplemental coinplaint (January G, 1956), the result is 2 years and 6 days.
In either of said methods it is clearly obvious that plaintiff has failed in his proof of a prescriptive user of 20
years or more. The facts and the law, as enunciated by
the cited authorities, require judgment in defendant's
favor on this facet and theory of the case.

B. Highways Over Public Lands
Plaintiff's cause of action as set forth in his Supplemental Complaint alleged facts upon which a claim for a
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private prescriptive way could b-e based. It is self evident from the allegations set forth above that the pleader's theory was that plaintiff had acquired by over twenty
Y(~arH continuous adverse user a private prescriptive
trail \Va~r over defendant's lands appurtenant to plaintiff's land located in the area. This claim is defeated by
the la'v and facts of the case as above demonstrated. An
PXa111ination of plaintiff's evidence shows it \\"as given in
Hupport of these allegations and of plaintiff's theory of
this case. There is not a suggestion or implication in
plaintiff's evidence that the general public was interested
or had ever used the alleged trail\Yay. He claimed and his
evidence u·as directed to pro,ce that he and his predecessors in interest clain~ed a prit·ate right o-cer defendant's
lauds. The defendant n1et this evidence by counter-posing
evidence and the Court based his interrogatories on plaintiff's theory (Interrogatories 9 and 10). This aspect of
the case \\Tas tried on the issue "Thether a private prescriptive easen1ent exi~ted over defendant's lands~ and not
on any other theory.
The authorities above eited definitely differentiate
l>Pt\\·epn (a) a priYate ease1nent acquired by prescription,
and (h) a u~Pr h~· the pulJlie of sufficient substance as to
indiea t <\ an aec<'pta neP hy the public of the offer by the
llnitPd Ntat<'S under R.. 8. :2477 ( 43 r:.s.C ..A... ~ Sec. 932).
lt i~ nppropri:lt<' to repeat here the ad1nonition of the
\r ~·otn ing ~n prPnH' l~ourt in Hatch Bros. ("~o. v. Black,
~upra:

.. , t 1nu~t hP horne in tnind that it is not a question of thP (\~tabli~lnnent of a high\Yay by preseri ptinn "·hieh i~ ht're in question, but the acceptanel\ of a grant *~~~,
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It will be a va1n search of the trial record to attempt to discover even a scintilla in evidence \vhich \vill
support a finding that prior to patent issuance to defendant a public highway existed over defendant's land.
Such evidence is simply not in the record. Evidence supporting a clain1 for a private prescriptive ease1nent \\rill
not prove the existence of a public high,vay. Each clai1n
is separate fron1 the other and in fact antagonistic. The
Court of Civil Appeals of California pointed U!J ~he
distinction in Ball v. Stephens supra, and the excerpt
quoted from that decision is not only pertinent to the
situation in this case, but decisively answers any argument which plaintiff might present to support a claim
that defendant took title to his lands under the 1953
patent burdened by public highway or road. Plaintiff
in his supplemental complaint never claimed that there
existed a ''pre-patent" highway under R.S. 2477. His
entire effort in his pleading and at the trial was to clain1
and prove a private trailway easement.
Any argument in support of the "public highway"
theory in this case fails to find support both in the evidence and in the law. If this action be treated as a law
action, then there is no finding by the jury as to the
existence of a pre-patent public highway. The failure of
the court to submit an interrogatory on this question is
no fault of the court. It would have been error on its
part to have done so inasmuch as plaintiff's pleadings
and his evidence are based alone on the private preseriptive right theory. Neither did plaintiff request the
Court to propound an interrogatory on the question of
the existence of a pre-patent public highway. His perti-
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nent requested interrogatories do not contain the words
'~public highway." They pertain only to private prescriptive rights. The "public highway" theory was not advanced at trial even by way of argument and certainly
not by the pleadings or evidence. If this action be treated
as one in equity the "public highway" theory fails because there is no evidence to support the finding of the
pre-patent public user under R.S. 2477. The Court would
commit gross error in making such a finding. Plaintiff,
hy means of his pleadings and evidence, lulled both the
defendant and the Court into the belief that he \Yas relying only on the private prescriptive right theory. The
pre-patent "public highway" theory and argument comes
too late to be available to plaintiff. Beyond all peradventures defendant is entitled to judgment in his favor
on this facet of the case.
POINT II
PLAINTIFF HAS ACQUIRED NO PRIVATE PRESCRIPTIVE TRAILWAY EASEMENT OVER DEFENDANT'S
"HOMESTEAD PROPERTY," BEING THE LAND CONVEYED TO DEFENDANT BY THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA BY PATENT DATED FEB. 6, 1939, AND RECORDED ON AUGUST 7, 1939, IN BOOK 3 Y AT PAGES 377,
378, AND NEITHER DID THERE EXIST A PUBLIC HIGHWAY OVER DEFENDANT'S SAID LAND PRIOR TO PATENT.

1.

STATEMENT OF

F-~-~CTS.

Defendant acquired the fee si1nple title to land deJineated as '~I>ink :2'' on Exhibit P Ex. I by virtue of
Federal patent dated February 6, 1939, and recorded on
August 7, 1939 (R. 170). The land is particularly described as:

lG
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NW 14 SEI4 and SW1;4 NE1;4 of Sec. 15, Twp. 2
South, Range 5 East, Salt Lake Base and 1feridian.
rThis land also was part of the public domain ovvned by
the United States of America prior to the date of the
patent. It was acquired by defendant under the Federal
Homestead Law, and is for convenience designated herein as ("Homestead" lands). Plaintiff has pleaded a
private trailway easement over this '"homestead" land
(See Par. I, pg. 2 of his Supplemental Complaint) and
attempted proof of facts in the endeavor to establish such
private prescriptive trailway easement. This alleged
private trailway easement represents the southeastern
portion of the same trailway claimed b yplaintiff over the
lands of defendant particularly described in Point I of
this brief. The alleged trailway over the "homestead"
lands is the initial portion of the a1leged "Stansbury
Island" trailway (P Ex. I). Plaintiff's pleading and
evidence were solely directed toward claiming and proving a private trailway easement over the "homestead"
lands. There is not a scintilla of evidence in the record
with respect to the existence of a pre-patent "public
highway." Plaintiff requested no interrogatory on the
question of the existence of a pre-patent public highway
and the Court propounded none. Plaintiff's relevant
pleading on this issue is quoted verbatim in Point I of
this brief. There is no finding by the jury as to the
existence of a pre-patent "public highway" over and
across the "homestead" lands.
2. CITATION OF AUTHORITIES.
See authorities cited in Point I, 2, supra of this
brief.
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3. ARGUMENT.
Again plaintiff fails in establishing a private prescriptive ease1nent over and across defendant's lands last
above described. The homestead patent in defendant's
favor was dated February 6, 1939, and was recorded August 7, 1939 (R. 170). Plaintiff filed his Supplemental
Complaint alleging his right to a trailway easement over
said land on January 6, 1956. The expired time is therefore 16 years, 4 months and 29 days. If the date of the
patent is taken as the starting point (Feb. 6, 1939) to date
of filing Supplemental Complaint Jan. 6, 1956, the expired time is 16 years, and 11 months. Obviously neither
of said computations yields a period of prescriptive user
short of the required 20 years. The period of use of the
defendant's lands by plaintiff and predecessors \vhen
title to same was in the United States cannot be and is
not counted in determining the time of adverse user.
(See authorities cited in Point I supra). In the first
instance it is 3 years, 7 months and 1 day short. In the
second instance it is 3 years and 1 n1onth deficient.
1Jnder the law and the facts defendant is entitled to
judgment of Court quieting his title as to said land
against plaintiff's pretended clain1 of a private prescriptive right over defendant's '~hon1estead" lands.
The pre-patent "public high\Yay" theory is as equally inapplicable to defendanfs ~~ho1nestead'' lands as it
is to the lands of defendant described in Point I of this
brief. The legal authorities and argu1nent hereinbefore
submitted against the adoption of said theory are restated
and reaffirnted as to defendant ~s ~~ ho1nestead ~, lands.
l\lanifestly defendant is entitled to judg1nent in this

lS
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action denying the existence of a pre-patent "pubic highv.ray" over his ''homestead" lands.
POINT III
PLAINTIFF HAS NEVER ACQUIRED THE RIGHT TO
USE THE WATER, WHICH DURING .CERTAIN SEASONS
OF THE YEAR ACCUMULATES ON DEFENDANT'S LAND
SITUATE IN SECS. 9 AND 22, TWP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 5
WEST, SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN.

1.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.

The pertinent findings by the jury relative to this
phase of the case are found in response to the prepoundjng of the following interrogatories :
"11-Do you find by a preponderance of the
evidence that the plaintiff and his predecessors in
ownership used the lands of the defendant in Sections 9 and 22, Twp. 2 South, Range 5 West anrl
the water holes, if any, upon said lands to water
his cattle for a period of 20 consecutive years prior
to May 31, 1955 : Answer: Yes.
"12-If your answer to No. 11 is yes, answer
the following question:
"For how many consecutive years prior to
l\1ay 31, 1955, has the plaintiff and his predecessors in ownership used said lands and water
holes ~ Answer : 50 years.''
There are no jury findings as to the origin of the water
nor its quantity, nor the nature and size of the deposit of
'vater nor whether it was and is produced as a result of
man or as a natural accumulation, nor as to the frequency
or infrequency of its accumulation on the said lands. The
interrogations assumed the existence of water on said
lands in "water holes." It is therefore necessary to consider the evidence introduced at the trial. There is a
high degree of conflict in the evidence. The evidence of
19
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the defendant denies the presence of water, and the existence of "water holes" (R. 18, 22). At the most, these are
]ow places which are "bogs" or mud holes during most
seasons of the year (R. 23). According to defendant,
the "bog" or 1nud hole in Sec. 9 was "dynamited" in 1938
or 1939 and since that time there has been no sign of
'vater (R. 191). Defendant has never seen plaintiff's
cattle drink at any "hole" on said section, but rather
ihey went to adjacent flowing wells to drink (R. 19, 23).
There were and are no live streams or springs on said
sections. Examination of said lands was made in 1945
by witnesses in connection with defendant's "exchange"
transaction with the United States. These witnesses
testified in substance that there were no "water holes"
as the term is ordinarily used nor were there live strearns
or springs on the land. On one of the sections there "\Yas
a low place or "bog" but it contained little if any ,,~ater.
Plaintiff testified "water holes" existed in said sections and cattle drank from sa1ne ( R. 6-±, 65, 88). The
water stands in the holes and does not flow out on the
lands (R. 84). There are four s1nall holes on See. 9 (R.
83). They hold water the year long-"\Yater fit for eattle
to drink (R. 85). Cattle have used then1 for years during
all months of the year. The so ealled '""Tater holes" are
jn truth but cow tracks \vhich during certain seasons of
the year fill "\vith \\~ater (R. 86, 88). '':rater does not flow
off in a channel (R. 87). Pierre Castagno testified in
the sunnner of 1952 there \\~as "~ater in the ··hole~, on
Sec. 9 sufficient to \\~a ter 30 or 40 horses and that in the
spring of the year there is sufficient water in the "holes"
to water 20 or 30 head of cattle (R. 255). Tony Castagno
20
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testified there are "water holes" on said sections, which
eontain water during all times of the year and in amount
sufficient to water cattle. They are never completely
dried up (R. 295). Rose Castagno stated there are three
vvater holes on land "north of the old ho1nestead" (R.
:-304). None of them ever died up and they contained
"\Vater at all times of drinkable quality (R. 304). Keith
\Vanless testified there are water holes on said sections
and water is of such quantity and quality as to be drinkable (R. 308, 310). Water was in the "holes" in 1956 sufficient to water cattle (R. 310, 311). Twenty-five cows
could water at those "holes" (R. 317).
Included in the presentation of the Argument, hereinafter contained, reference is made to other testimony
in the case.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY ENACTMENTS.
(1) If the water, which durivng certain seasons of
the year accumul.ates on defendant's lands in Section 9
and 22, Twp. 2 South, Range 5 West, Salt Lake B. and
M. is in the nature of either (a) waste or seepage water,
or (b) surface water, or (c) percolating water, at no
time has it been nor is i't now subject to appropriation
and neither could any rights thereto be acquired by prescripti~on. (56 Am. J ur.-W aters-Sec. 66, Pgs. 548, 549).
A. Waste Water
"*** The owner of a water right, after diversion from the stream is the owner and entitled to
the water itself, the corpus of the water as long as
he retains it in his ditches and reservoirs on his
property and under his control ***As long as the
water is under the control of the appropriator in
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his land or in his ditches or reservoirs or other
things owned and controlled by him, it is still his
water and he may use it in any lawful place or
for any lawful use he chooses, or may lease and
sell it. ***" (Srnithfield ·west Bench Irrigation
Co. v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 105 Utah 468,
142 Pac. (2nd) 866, 871 ; also 113 Utah 356, 195
Pac. (2nd) 249.)
"However in the absence of such a statute it
is generally held that such waste of water and
seepage cannot be appropriated * * * The
plaintiff apparently bases its claim to the exclusive right to the use of this waste water whenever
it is available upon the fact that it has been using
such waste water for a long period of time-without
interruption. However, I do not believe that an
exclusive right to the use of the waste water can
be acquired in this manner." (Justice Wolfe in
Smithfield West Bench Irrigation Co. v. Union
Central Life Ins. Co., supra, and particularly at
pg. 871 of 149 Pac. (2nd).
See also: Lasson v. Seeley, 120 lTtah 679, :238
Pac. (2nd) 418.
"The question for decision is ''Thether the
plaintiff has n1ade a valid appropriation of \Yaste
water as against the defendants, or \Yhether the
defendants have a right, as against plaintiff, to
intercept upon their O\Yn land, and before it
passes therefroin, \Yater "Thich has been spread
upon the san1e, but not entirely consu1ned, in the
process of irrigation. It \Yill be observed fron1
the foregoing state1nent that it is only to such
\Yater as has actuall~T eseaped fron1 defendants,
and reached her O\\Tn lands that plaintiff n1akes
claim. *** It is 1nanifest that, as against the defendants, the plaintiff has not n1ade a valid appropriation of this alleged \Yaste "-rater. Just
what constitutes "Taste "Tater in every instance
\ve do not decide, but it is unquestionably true,
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so far as concerns the right to make a valid appropriation of it, this water is not waste water
so long as it ren1ains upon the lands of the defendants, and does not, in any event, become such until
it has escaped and reached the lands of others.
The plaintiff certainly has acquired no vested
right to compel the defendants to apply the waters,
the right to the use of which they own, in such a
way as that some of it will not soak into their
own ground, but escape and pass from the surface
onto her lands.*** So long as, and while, the water
which is applied by defendants to the irrigation
of their lands remains upon the same, it is, as
against the plaintiff, their exclusive property,
whatever may be the rights of plaintiff as against
some other claimant to it as waste water." (Burkart v. Meiberg, 37 Colo. 187, 86 Pac. 98, 6 LRA
(NS) 1104.)
"Defendant's case, both by pleading and evidence, is that these waters did not constitute
springs or natural water courses, but percolated
through, and by artificial means had been collected into bodies or artificial springs on defendant
Baker's own land, which by artificial surface
channels flowed into plaintiff's canal, and was,
with his consent, used by plaintiff only when he
did not choose to use the same for his own lawful purposes, which he often did. * * The trial
court found, in accordance with the defendants'
claim, that these waters originally existed as
percolating waters in defendant Baker's land, and
by artificial means were developed and collected
by him into artificial basins in the semblance of
springs, and as such, therefore, belonged to him,
as an integral part of his own land, which ownership has never been divested. * * * The law, under
the facts, makes these waters, arising, as they
do, on defendant Baker's lands, whether they be
artificially collected percolating waters or the
•X<
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waters of a natural flowing stream or spring, his
property, as against the plaintiff in this case, unless the latter has acquired them in some way
known to the law. *** And it is of no consequence
here whether they are natural springs arising on
the defendant's lands or have been intercepted
as percolating waters and artificially collected.
"The doctrine of appropriation, as understood in the arid states, may or may not, under
the facts of the case, apply to these waters. That
we need not decide, for it is clear that, according
to the findings, the plaintiff has not made a valid.
appropriation. *** It is also equally clear that
no right by prescription or adverse use has been
established, for the findings were that whenever
defendant Baker wished to use these \Vaters for
his own domestic purposes, for irrigating lands,
or for filling fish ponds, or for sale as merchandise, or otherwise, he did so under clain1 of ownership." (Smith Canal and Ditch Co. v. Colorado Ice
& Storage Co., 34 Colo. 485, 82 Pac. 940, 3 LR_._:i_
(N.S.) 1148.)
"It is probably safer, for the benefit of all,
and for the sake of stability of water rights, to declare definitely that an appropriation of seepage
water is void. Of course, if a party has once obtained possession of such "\Yater, and another party
not entitled thereto should atte1npt to deprive him
thereof, the possessor "\Yould doubtless have a
cause of action. Wiel, supra, Sec. 55. But that
is not the situation here. The intervener "~anted
to get possession, and sues because Binning prevented hi1n frou1 getting it." (Binning 1'. ill-iller,
88. Wyo. -tf>1 ; 102 Pac. (2nd) 5-l-. at pg. G~).
Likewise, in I~inney on Irrigation, 2nd Ed.,
volun1e 2, page 1151, Section 661. is the follo,Ying:
'Authorities hold that "\vhile the "\Vater,
so deno1uinated as "\vaste "\Vater, 1nay be used
4

•
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after it escapes, no permanent right can be
acquired to have the discharge kept up, either
by appropriation, or a right by prescription,
estoppel, or acquiescence in its use while it is
escaping, and that, too, even though expensive ditches or works were constructed for
the purpose of utilizing such waste water,
unless some other element enters into the
condition of affairs, other than the mere use
of the water. In other words, the original appropriators have the right, and in fact it is
their duty to prevent, as far as possible, all
waste of the water which they have appropriated, in order that the others 'vho are entitled thereto may receive the benefit thereof.'
Also, section 662, at page 1153 :
'After water has been appropriated and
diverted from a natural stream into ditches,
canals, or other artificial works, it becomes
personal property and cannot be appropriated from such works.'
"There is no obligation upon an owner to continue to maintain conditions so as to supply water
to appropriators of waste water at any time or
in any quantity when acting in good faith."
(Tongue Creek Orchard Co. v. Town of Orchard
City, 131 Colo. 177, 280 Pac. (2nd) 426, 428.)
"Neither the rule of reasonable use nor the
rule of correlative rights has any application to
percolating water which is the result of the landowner irrigating his land. The rules are limited
in their application to such water as percolate8
through the soil from natural causes. If a landowner conveys water onto his premises by artificial irrigation and thereby causes water to percolate through his land and into adjoining land, the
owner of the adjoining land does not acquire a
vested right to have the water continue to so
percolate through his land. A landowner may
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irrigate or fail to irrigate his land, and, although
by irrigation a benefit is conferred upon an adjoining landowner, such benefit may be withheld
at pleasure. Percolating water resulting from the
irrigation of one's own land may be recovered
and used by the owner before it leaves his land
without invading any right of an adjoining landowner." (Petersen v. Cache County Drai·nage District, 77 Utah 256, 294 Pac. 289, 291.)
"It is sufficient to here state, without approving or disapproving the doctrine of the reasonable
use rule, that the facts as found by the court do
not bring the case within that rule. The seepage
or percolating water here involved is created by
the artificial irrigation of appellant's land. True,
as a result of this irrigation, the \Yater sinks,
seeps, and percolates into the soil of appellant'~
land and saturates it for a depth of several feet;
it, nevertheless, is nothing more in- fact and in
law than surface or waste \Yater. *** The la\v
is well settled, in fact the authorities all agree,
that one landowner receiving \Yaste \Yater -which
flows, seeps, or percolates from the land of another cannot acquire a prescriptive right to such
water, nor any right (except by grant) to have
the owner of the land fron1 which he obtains the
water continue the flo\v. The general rule regarding the right of the owner of land to surface \Yater
therein is stated by ~Ir. Farnha1n, in his \York on
Water Rights (page 2572), as follo\vs: ~There is
no right on the part of a lo\ver appropriator to
have surface water flo\v to his land fro1n upper
property. The owner of the soil on \Yhich it falls
has an absolute right to it, and 1nay do "~th it
what he pleases. And the fact that surface \Vater
has flowed from the land of one n1an onto that
of another for 1nore than 20 years ''Till not prevent
the for1ner fro1n draining his land so as to cut of-f
the flow.'
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"In 1 Wiel on Water Rights (3d Ed.) p. 50,
the author says : 'While artificial flow claimants
1nay thus have priorities between themselves, they
can have no right of continuance against the owner of the natural supply (the appropriator on the
natural stream ***), except by grant, condemnation, or dedication (or by rule of compulsory service where the water is distributed to public use).
The chief instance of artificial flows in practice
is where some stream owner has carried 'vater
to a distance and, after use, discharges it belo\v
his land or works. *** Seeing the water con1e
down, other parties arrive, build ditches belovv,
receive the water, and put it to use. Yet unless
they have a contract with the stream owner, they
must generally rely upon continued receipt from
him of such water at their peril. In such case the
creator of this artificial flovv may cease to allo'v
it to escape.' And on page 52 it is said: "In the
absence of contract, the natural water-right ovvner
may cease the abandonment of waste fro1n a ditch,
and so use the water that none of it thereafter
runs waste, or so that it runs off in a new place
where people below no longer can get it. Long
receipt by them of the water of itself gives no
permanent right to have the discharge continued,
whether by appropriation, prescription, or estoppel, even though the lower claimants built expensive ditches or flumes to catch the waste.'
Numerous decisions are cited by the author in a
note to the text which illustrate and support this
doctrine. And again on page 54 it is said: 'Waste
water soaking from the land of another after irrigation need not be continued, and may be intercepted and taken by such original irrigator, and
conducted elsewhere, though parties theretofore
using the waste are deprived thereof.' ( Garn v.
Rollins, 41 Utah 260, 125 Pac. 867, 871, 872.)
"It is a rule long recognized that a 'landowner
cannot acquire a prescriptive right to the con-
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tinued flow of waste or seepage water from the
land of another, that is, seepage water or waste
water running from one's land to that of another
need not be continued and it may be intercepted
and taken by such owner at any time and used on
the land to which it is appurtenant.
'No valid appropriation can be made or
prescriptive right acquired by gathering surplus water as it flows over the surface fron1
adjoining property upon which it has been
spread for irrigation purposes, or by merely
accepting and using water when it is allowed
to flow into one's ditch by the original owner,
who makes exclusive use of it whenever he
chooses to do so.' 30 Am. Jur. 611, Sec. 19.
"The original appropriator may at any tune
recapture waste water remaining on his land and
apply it to a beneficial use. Barker v. Sonner, 135
Or. 75, 294 P. 1053; Sebern v. l\Ioore, -±-!Idaho -±10,
258 P. 176; Reynolds Irrigation Co. v. Sproat
70 Idaho 217, 214 P. 2d 880.
"Hence, as against the original appropriator
and owner, an adjoining land O\\Tier cannot acquire a prescriptive right to \Yaste or seepage
water." (Thompson t\ Biughanz, 78 Idaho 305, 302
Pac. (2nd) 9-+8, 949.
"We think the evidence both for appellants
and respondent tends to sho\Y that the \Vaters in
dispute are seepage and pereolating \Yatel's. These
waters rose in such quantities on respondent'='
land that it beean1e subn1erged and \Yas rendered
unfit for the raising of hay and other fa.rn1 products. The respondent undoubted!~~ had a right to
drain his land of the \Yater and put it in a eondition for raising crops. 'Vhether he did this by
sinking \YPlls or by digging drain ditehes \Yas
of no eoncern to appellants. The \Yater thus de~8
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veloped or collected being waste water which seeps
and percolates into respondent's land from adjoining lands, he had the legal right to make whatever beneficial use of it he deemed proper, and he
did not invade any right of appellant's by so doing.
We think the right to the use of the water in this
case comes squarely within the rule announced in
the case of Garns v. Rollins, 125 Pac. 867, recently
decided by this court." (Roberts v. Gribble, 43
Utah 411, 134 Pac. 1014, 1016.)

B. Surface Water
"The terin 'surface water'·is used in the la\v
of waters in reference to a distinct form or class
of water which is generally defined as that which
is derived from falling rain or melting snow, or
which rises to the surface in springs, and is diffused over the surface of the ground while it remains in such diffused state or condition. It is
thus distinguished from water flowing in a natural
water course or collected into and forming a definite and identifiable body, such as a lake or pond.
In some instances the courts have classed as surface waters such as lie or spread over the surface,
or percolate the soil, as in swamps and do not flow
in any particular direction." (56 Am. Jur. Waters-Sec. 65, pgs 547, 548.)
" (Surface) waters, in a legal sense are those
which fall on the land, by precipitation from the
skies, or arise in springs and spread over the surface of the ground without being collected into a
definite body. McDaniel v. Cummings, 83 Cal.
515; 8 L.R.A. 575, 23 Pac. 795; 3 Farnham Waters,
Sec. 278." (San Gabriel Valley Country Club v.
Los Angeles County, 182 Cal. 392, 188 Pac. 554,
9 A.L.R. 1200.)
"Surface waters are those which are produced
by rain fall, melting snow, or springs, and which
in cases of the two first mentioned sources are
29
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precipitated, and in the case of the last mentioned
source rise upon the land*** Such waters are not
divested of their character as surface waters by
reason of their flowing from the land on which
they first make their appearance on to lo"\ver land
in obedience to the law of gravity." (Le Brun v.
Richards, 210 Cal. 308, 291 Pac. 825, 72 A.L.R.
336.)
"The term 'surface water' includes such as is
carried off by surface drainage-this is drainage
independently of a water course." (Snyder v. Platt
Valley, etc. Irrig. Co., 144 Neb. 308, 12 N.W. (2d)
160, 160 A.L.R. 1164.)
"*** the weight of authority is to the effect
that the right to flow of surface water from an adjoining tract cannot be acquired by prescription."
(56 Am. Jur. Waters, Sec. 66, pg. 549.)
"From the facts here it is clear that we are
not concerned \vith the rules which pertain to
surface waters in the con1monly accepted n1eaning of that term in adjudications of this type.
That term as so used means \Vater diffused over
the surface of the ground and derived generally
from falling rains or n1elting sno\v, and it continues to be such until it reaches \vell defined
channels wherein it custo1narily flo\vs at \Yhich
time it becomes part of a streanL Once part of a
stream, it does not again beeo1ne surface "Tater
simply beeause it overflo\\Ts the banks. \\~ ater
whieh eontinues to flo"T in the sa1ne direetion even
though outside the banks, and \Yhieh returns to the
ehannel upon the subsidence of the flood is part
of a running strean1 and it loses its character as
sueh only" \Yhen it 8preads out oYer the open eountry, settles in lakes or pools, or finds so1ne other
outlet." (11/rf{ell l'. Sj)(lJlish Fork~. 6 lTtah (:2nd)
92, 305 Pae. (2nd) 1097.)

C. Percolat,ing TT' aters
''The \Yaters issuing fron1 the artificial tunnel
30
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into the lake are found to be underground, percolating waters from the mining claim of the defendant, and not vvaters naturally flo\ving in a stream
with a well-defined channel, banks, and course.
Under such a state of facts, the law seems to be
well settled that water percolating through the
soil is not, and cannot be, distinguished from the
soil itseli. The owner of the soil is entitled to
the waters percolating through it, and such \Vater
is not subject to appropriation. The ordinary
rules of law applying to the appropriation of
surface streams do not apply to percolating \\Tater
and subterranean streams, with undefined and
unknown courses and banks. When \\Tater per eolates through and under the surface of the earth
upon land belonging to one person, and comes
to the surface just before it empties itself upon
the land of another, the owner of such land has
no right to de1nand that such percolation shall
continue. ***.
"It is clear that, vrior to the ti1ne \vhen the
tunnel vvas dug upon the Inining claim of the defendant, the water was percolating \Vater, flowing,
seeping, or circulating in minute particles beneath
the surface thereof, without banks or defined channels, and that its course was invisible and unknown. By the construction of this tunnel, this
percolating water has beco1ne an artificial strea1n,
and has never been diverted fron1 the defendant'3
land, nor its waters taken away from the defendant or its grantors. {Tnder such circu1nstances,
when percolating vvaters have been gathered into
tunnels or ditches, and allowed to flo\v from the
proprietor's land to the inferior proprietor, and
have been used by him a greater period of ti1ne
than that allowed by the statute of limitations, it
has been held that no title by prescription ha8
been gained." (Crescent Min. Co. v. Silver J(?.Jlfl
Mining Co., 17 Utah 444, 54 Pac. 244, 245, 247.)
:~1
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"\\!. .hen the United States issued it patent to
the respondent, neither the bog nor 1narsh, nor
the water in question, was visible upon the land
conveyed. Nor was there any known and defined
subterranean stream thereon. At that time the
water, if it existed at all, was percolating through
the· soil, or flowing· in a subterranean stream,
having no defined or known channels, courses, or
banks. Water so percolating and flo\ving forn1s :1
part of the realty, and belongs to the owner of
the soil. A conveyance or grant by the United
States of any part of the public domain to a person, natural or artificial, carries \vith it the right
of filtrating or percolating water, and to streams
flowing through the soil beneath the surface, but
in undefined and unknown channels, just the same
as it carries with it the right to rocks and minerals
jn the ground which have not been reserved in the
instrument of conveyance or by statute. Water,
intermingling vvith the ground or flowing through
it by filtration or percolation or by chemical attraction, is but a component part of the earth, and
has no characteristics of ownership distinct from
the land itself. In the eye of the law, water so commingled and flowing, or motionless, underneath
the surface, is not the subject of ownership apart
and distinct from the soil. If, however, subsurface streams of water flow in clearly-defined
channels, it is otherwise, for then the rules of
law applicable to surface strean1s and waters
apply·." (Willow Creek Irrigation Co. v. Michaelson, 21 Utah 248, 60 Pac. 9-b3.)

( 2) At all tinles since 111ay 11, 1903, the only 1neth od
by which plaintiff could have acquired the right to 1Jse
the waters which accunMtlates ou defendant's lands in
Sections 9 and 22, Twp. 2 South_, Range 5 West, Salt
Lake Base and 11! eridian, was by forrnal appropriation
of same as prescribed by the statutes of the State of [Tta.h.
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'1'he · acqttisition of rights to use water in Utah by prescription has been prohibited since said date.
A. Constitu,tional and Statutory Enactments
HAll existing rights to the use of any waters
in this State for any useful or beneficial purpose,
are hereby recognized and confirmed." ( Constitution of State of Utah, ART. XVII, Sec. 1.)
"'All \\Taters in this state, whether above or
under the ground are hereby declared to be the
property of the public, subject to all existing
rights to the use thereof." (La,vs of Utah 1919,
Chap. 67, Sec. 1; R.S. 1933, Sec. 100-1-1; Laws of
utah 1935, 8hap. 105, Sec. 1; Utah Code Ann.
1943, Sec. 100-1-1; litah Code Ann. 1953, Sec. 731-1.)
The Fifth Regular Session of the Legislature of the
State of Utah, convened in February and l\1arch, 1903,
adopted a Water Code \vhich repealed all prior laws on
the subject of vv"" ater Rights and Irrigation. (La\VS of
Utah, 1903, Chap. 100, pg. 88). Section 3-! of this enactment reads as follows :
"Rights to the use of any of the [tnappropri-·
ated water iu the State 1nay be acquired by appropriation, in the 1nanner hereinafter provided,
and not otherwise. The appropriation must be
for some useful or beneficial purpose, and, as
between appropriators, the one first in time should
be first in right." (Italics supplied.)
rrhis new Water Code was approved by the 9-overnor
on March 12, 1903, and became effective sixty days after
March 12, 1903 (date of sine die adjournment of the
Legislature), or on May 11, 1903.

The Sixth Regular Session of the Legislature of the
State of Utah convened in :B'ebruary and March, 1905,
repealed Chapter 100 of the Laws of Utah 1903 (La\vs of
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Utah 1905, Chap. 108, pg 145 ), and enacted another Water
Code. However, the 1905 Code continued, Sec. 34 of the
1903 Code, in exact form as above set forth. (It continued to bear the number of Section 34.) The 1905 Code
specifically provided, according to Constitutional mandate, that it should become effective on approval. The
(fovernor approved the Code March 9, 1905, and said date
\Vas therefore the effective date of the 1905 Code.
When Compiled Laws of Utah 1907 were prepared,
the Water Code of 1905 became Chapter 2 of Title 40 of
said Compiled Laws and Sec. 3-! of the Water Code of
1903 and 1905 were perpetuated in exact form and phraseology as first above quoted as Sec. 1288X5 Compiled Laws
of Utah 1907.
The Ninth Regular Session of the Legislature of the
State of Utah, convened January-February and March,
1911, amended Sec. 1288X5 (Compiled La\YS of Utah
1907, Chap. 103, Laws of Utah 1911, pg. 1-±3) to read as
follows:
"Rights to the ruse of the unappropriated
water in the State may be acquired by appropriation in the 1nanner hereinafter prol·ided, and not
otherwise. The appropriation n1ust be for son1e
useful and. beneficial purpose, and, as between
appropriators, the one first in ti1ne shall be first
in right; (procided that, when a use designated in
an application to appropriate any of the unappropriated 1caters of the State zcould nlaterially interfere with a n1ore beneficial use of such zrater. then
the appropriation shall be dealt with as provided
in Section 1288Xl8). (Italics supplied.)
The Governor approved this Act on ~{arch 20, 1911.
The Legislative session adjourned l\Iarch 9, 1911. The
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Act, therefore became effective May 10, 1911.
vVhen Compiled Laws of 1917 were prepared, Sec.
1288X5, Compiled Laws of Utah, 1907, as amended by
Chapter 103, Laws of Utah, 1911, last above quoted, beeame Sec. 3450, Co1np. Laws of Utah 1917, and was a
part of Title 55, Chap. 3.
•.

The Thirteenth Regular Session of the Legislature
of Utah, convened January, February and March 1919,
by Chapter 67, Laws of Utah 1919 (pg. 177) repealed
the Water Code as it appeared in Title 55, Chapters 1,
2and 3, Compiled Laws of Utah 1917, and enacted an
entirely new Water Code. However, Sec. 41 of this enactment repeated verbatim Sec. 3450, Compiled Laws of
Utah 1917. Chapter 67, Laws of Utah 1919, was approved
11arch 13, 1919, and since it carried an e1nergency clause
it became effective on said date.
Title 100, Chap. 3, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933,
set forth verbatim Sec. 41, Laws of Utah 1919 (which
in its amended form was Sec. 3450, Comp. Laws of Utah
1.917). In the R.S. of Utah 1933 the pertinent section
\Vas designated Sec. 100-3-1 of the R.S.
The t\venty-first Regular Session of the Legislature
of Utah, convened January, February and March 1935,
amended Sec. 100-3-1, R.S. of Utah 1933, to read as follows:
"Rights to the use of the unappropriated public waters in this state may be acquired only as
provided in this title. No appro ]Jriation of UJatc r
may be made and no rights to the use thereof
initiated and no notice of i'ntent to appropriate
shall be recognized except appli(·ation for such
appropriation first be Inade to the State Engineer
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in the manner hereinafter provided, and not otherwise. The appropriation must be for some useful
and beneficial purpose and as between appropriators, the one fir:st in time shall be first in
•
right; provided that when a use designated by an
application to appropriate any of the unappropriated waters of the State would materially
interfere with a more beneficial use of such water,
the application shall be dealt with as provided in
Section 100-3-8." (Italics supplied.) (La\vs of
Utah, 1935, Chap. 105, pg. 195-196.)
The T\venty-third Regular Session of the Legislature of Utah, convened January, February and March
1939, amended Sec. 100-3-1, R.S. of Utah 1933, as amended by Chap. 105, Laws of Utah 1935, Chap. 105, quoted
in full above, by repeating same in exact language as
above set forth and then adding:
"No right to the use of water either appropriated or unappropriated can be acquired by adverse use or adverse possession."
This amended statute of 1939 carried an en1ergency
clause and thereby became effective on approval, ,,~hich
\\~as March 20, 1939.
Utah Code Ann. 1943, repeats
and amendment in exact form as
100-3-1. Likewise Utah Code Ann.
enactment and an1endment as Sec.
provision to date.

the 1939 reenactn1ent
above given, as Sec.
1953 repeats the 1939
73-3-1, and brings the

B. Judicial Decisions
"The question is therefore clearly presented
whether the actual diversion of ·w. ater prior to
Inaking an application to the state engineer gives
to the party- 1naking the diversion a right superior
36
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to another who first files his application in the
state engineer's office.
"Chapter 67. Laws of Utah 1919, relates to
water and water rights. The act is designated as
"An act defining general provisions concerning
water and water rights, the appropriation, administration,' etc., and amends some prior laws. Section 41 of that chapter, so far as material here,
provides:
'Rights to the use of the unappropriated
public water in the state may be acquired
by appropriation, in the manner hereinafter
provided, and not other,vise."
""The section further provides that tne it vpropriation n1ust be for a beneficial purpose, and
that as between two appropriators the one first in
time shall be first in right. *** The first Utah
legislative act, so far as I have been able to as-certain, respecting the method or mode of appropriating water, was passed by the Legislature of
1897 (La-\YS 1F597, c. 52).*** By the act of 1897 any
person desiring thereafter to appropriate water
was required to post notices in 'vriting in t\vo
conspicuous places, one at the post office nearest
the point of intended diversion, and the other at
the point of intended diversion. *** Apparently
no other or further legislation was enacted respecting the appropriation of \Yater until 1903.
(Laws 1903 c. 100). The Legislature 1n that year
incorporated in the act relating to water rights
and irrigation section 41 as the same appears in
chapter 67. Laws Utah 1919. Numerous an1endInents were n1ade to the irrigation la\vs of thi~
state by the Legislatures Ineeting since 1903, but
in none of such legislation has the method or manner of appropriating water as prescribed by the
Legislature of 1903 been changed or modified. ***
If our statute did not contain the words 'and not
otherwise,' then the decisions of the appellate
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courts of Idaho and Wyoming ought to and would
have much weight in a determination of the question now under consideration. It is a matter of
common knowledge in this state that many controversies arose between claimants and much litigation resulted prior to our legislative act of 1903
respecting the dates of the appropriation by different claimants of the waters of the state. Very
much of that litigation had to do exclusively with
the dates of the appropriations. The rule or principle of law that he who \Yas first in time \vas
first in right had become permanently established
in the jurisprudence of the state. The fact as to
who was a prior appropriator was in much, if not
all, of the litigation a controverted question, and
one which in many cases was most difficult to
determine by reason of there being no public record of just when such appropriations \\~ere made.
It is therefore not only reasonable and fair to conclude, but affords a strong argument to support
the claim, that the language found in the act of
1903 -was intended to mean and does n1ean that the
only method to be recognized thereafter "~as the
method therein prescribed. *** \Y. e are of the
opinion, and so hold, that the Legislature of Utah,
by the act of 1903, intended to linrit the n1ethod of
acquiring any rights to the unappropriated public
waters of the state to the method or means prescribed in that act. The rights attempted to be
acquired by respondent Hooppiania by actually
diverting the \Yater and applying the san1e to a
beneficial use n1ust therefore be held to be subject
to the right of appellant "~ho "~ill acquire the first
right hy con1pleting its appropriation initiated by
its application filed in the state engineer's office
on April 25, 191S. '' (Deserc:t Lire Stock Co. c.
66 Ut a1
I .·).p ac. -rl
1-9
10·)
10q)
.
. . (_). ·)•")()
--~)._
• -±0-.
-r0~•.
H oopp1aua.
''I eonenr in the opinion of 1\Ir. Chief Justice

Gideon that Chopter 67, Sess. La,Ys of lTtah 1919,
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provides an exclusive 1nethod for the appropriation of public ''Tater in the state of Utah. The very
language and purpose of the act, when construed
in connection \vith the acts vvhich it superseded
and repealed, demonstrates conclusively that the
purpose was to vrovide an exclusive method of
appropriating \Yater and securing a record title
thereto. * * * The method presented for appropriating vvater com1nences with chapter 100, Sess.
Laws 1903, § 34, which section furnishes the key
for interpreting all that follo\\TS do\\Tn to and
including section 46. Section 34 reads as follo\vs:
'Rights to the use of any of the unappropriated water in the state 1nay be acquired
by appropriation, in the 1nanner hereinafter
provided, and not otherwise. The appropriation must be for some useful or beneficial
purpose, and, as between appropriators, the
one first in time shall be first in right.'

* : :· * The history of the legislation upon this
subject, as above set forth, discloses the fact that
the statute involv5ng the question now before
the court has been under review at eight different sessions of the Utah Legislature. The la\\T,
as originally enacted in 1903, has been amended
and changed in divers respects, immaterial as
far as the question here is concerned, but the
manifestly exclusive features of the 1nethod of
procedure to rn·ocure title have never been
ehanged. * * * If plain, emphatic, unequivocal
language is not sufficient to express the intention
of the Legislature, in \vhat n1anner and h)· \\'hat
1neans can the 1--Aegislature express its intention~
If there \\"ere a single line, \Yord, or thought anywhere in the act inconsistent or in conflict "·ith
the express declaration of the LPfdslature at tlte
very starting point of the method of procedure
Inapped out by the Legislature, I \Yould eoncur
in the suggestion that we should resort to rules
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of construction in order to determine the intention of the statute; but the truth is the statute
is so plain frorn he beginning to the end of the
whole course of procedure that there is no occasion for resorting to rules of construction. * * *
Before concluding this opinion I feel impelled
to say that this statute has been in force for a
period of 22 years. Hundreds of thousands of
dollars of the public money have_ been expended
in maintaining suitable offices and parapi1ernalia
for carrying out the purposes of the act, to say
nothing about the amounts paid in saiaries to
the state engineer and his deputies, assistants,
and clerks. It cannot be denied that a system
whereby a complete record is required of rights
and titles to the use of water is infinitely superior to a system, if it can be called a systen1,
in which the evidence of title rests entirely in
parol and depends solely upon the men1ory of
man. It may be contended that this goes to the
policy of the act which belongs exclusively to the
Legislature, and is therefore outside the domain
of judicial interpretation. We contend, however,
that if the policy of the act is manifestly wise
and superior to previous systen1s fron1 the standpoint of policy, it is one of the most cogent
reasons why we should hold that the Legislature
n1ust have intended exactly '"hat it said and has
repeated and reiterated time after time for almost a quarter of a century." (Concurring opinion
of Mr. Justice Thurman in Deseret Lirestock Co.
vs. Hooppiania, supra)
"But respondents argue that all these cases,
except the one last cited, "~ere either tried or
were based upon rights claimed to have been
acquired prior to the enaet1nent of the la"\Y of
appropriation of "\Yater through the office of the
state engin~er, and (1) since the enact1nent of
that statute, 'vater rights can only be acquired
-±0
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by appropriation through the office of the state
engineer and can only be lost by abandonment,
and when abandoned it reverts to the state; and
(2) if water can be acquired by adverse user and
possession since the enactment of the appropriation laws, it cannot be so done after adjudication
of the rights, and in defiance of the terms of the
adjudication decree. The answer to the first proposition is found within the terms of the statute,
relative to appropriation. Sections 100-3-1 and
100-3-2, R.S. 1933, read:
'Rights to the use of the unappropriated
public waters in this state Inay be acquired
by appropriation in the manner hereinafter
provided, and not otherwise.' Section 100-3-1.
'Any person who is a citizen * * * in
order hereafter to acquire the right to the
use of any unappropriated public \Yater in
this state shall before co1nmencing the construction * * * n1ake an application in writing to the state engineer.' Section 100-3-2.
It is clear fron1 the language that the sections
above quoted apply only to acquiring rights in
the unappropriated public water, and have no
reference to \Vater rights vvhich have passed to
private o\vnership until they have been abandoned
and thereby reverted to the public. How may
water rights under the statute be lost~ Section
3468, Comp. La\vs 1917, in force during the times
involved in this action, reads :
'vVhen the appropriator or his successor
in interest abandons or ceases to use water
for a period of seven years, the right ceases,
and thereupon such water reve1'ts to the
public, and Inay again be appropriated, as provided in this title; but questions of abandonnJent
shall be questions of fact, and shall be determined as are other questions of fact.'
Construing this section, this court in Deseret
-1:1
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Live Stock Co. v. llooppiania, 66 Utah, 25, 239
P. 479, 481, said:
'By express language of the foregoing
statute there are two methods or means b~T
which one entitled to the use of waters in
the state may lose such right: (1) by abandonment; and (2) by ceasing to use the san1e
for a period of seven years.' "
(Han~n~ond

v. Johnson, 94 Utah 20, 66 Pac. (2nd)
894, 899; also 94 Utah 35, 75 Pac. (2nd) 164)
"Under our laws, rights in and to the use
of public waters, or of a natural stream or source,
may be acquired only by appropriation and by
an actual diversion of waters from the natural
channel or stream and a beneficial use made of
them and as by our statutes provided. Neither
the defendants nor their predecessors made any
diversion of the waters of the creek for \Yatering
live stock or for any other purpose. They, without
any diversion, merely permitted animals to drink
directly from the creek. That gave then1 no right
to or possession of the use of the waters, for as
said by the author, ~ Kinney on Irrigation and
Water Rights, 1242 that as 'no possession or
exclusive property (of \Yater) can be acquired
while it is still flo,ving and ren1aining in its
natural channel or strean1, it follo\vs~ therefore,
that in order to obtain possession of the \Yater
atte1npted to be appropriated, it is an indispensable requisite that there n1ust be an actual diversion of the \Vater fro1n its natural channel into
the appropriator\~ ditrh~ canaL reserYoir~ or other
strnetnre.' Case~ are there cited in support of
tlH• text.~' (Bountiful C'ity r. De Luca, 77 l~tah
107, 118 ~ ~9:2 l)ae. 19±~ 199: ·7:2 A.L.R,. 657)
"If t hi~ be nt>\v or added \Vater, no right
thereto ean attach or be asserted until after an
applieation has been filed in the office of the
-l-~
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state engineer. Deseret Live Stock Co. v. Ii oop}Jiania, 66 Utah 25, 239 P. 479; Bountiful City v.
De Luca, 77 1Ttah 107, 292 P. 194, 72 A.L.R. 657.
If it be considered as 1nerely a ehange in place
of diversion, it also n1ust start \vith an application
in the office of the state engineer, and notiee
must be given so interested parties could be heard
and their rights protected. Appellants pleaded in
their ans\\'er, and testified, that the proposed
\Vorks -vvould save fron1 evaporation and seepage
a considerable quantity of water and the Co1npan~r
would per1nit the Tcnvn to divert into its pipe
line a part thereof in consideration of the Town
doing the work and furnishing the 1none~r to
effect the savings. No application ,,·as n1ade to
the state engineer either to appropriate this \Vater
or to change the point of diversion of their \\·ater.
It is admitted that defendants' works would inclose the entire stream no\\r flo\\Ting in its natural
channel, thus excluding everyone (the public)
from enjoyn1ent of all rights therein. vVhen a
person seeks to do this, he has the burden of
showing his right so to do, and this burden appellants did not carry." (Adants v. To1rn of Portage,
95 {Ttah 1, 72 Pac. ((2nd) G48, 654
"What we did say \vas that the records (the
pleadings of appellant and the evidence) show the
waters in dispute, froin -vvhich appellant sought to
exclude respondents and the public generally,
-vvere waters which appellants had not appropriated, either by user before enactment of the statutory method, chapter 100, Laws Utah, 1903, now
Rev. St. 1933, 100-3-1 et seq., or by application
in the office of the engineer since such 1nethod
\vas prescribed. The trial court so found, and \\·c
upheld that finding. Thus, holding that appellants
had never had any rights to the waters used by
respondents, the ({Uestion of adverse user sine-2
1903 is in nowise determinative of the cause.~,
+:~
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(Adarns v. Town of Portage, 95 Utah 20, 81 Pac.
(2nd) 368 on rehearing)
"In the light of this evidence we proceed to
consider the defenses urged. First, as to the defense of valid appropriation. We conclude that
if these defendants had made a valid appropriation prior to the l{i1nball Decree, all rights secured thereunder would have been lost by the
entry of that Decree which awarded them no
water. Since the entry of the Kimball Decree in
1922, in fact since 1903, the method for appropriation of unappropriated water has been prescribed
by statute and we have consistently held that
this statutory procedure for appropriating "\Yater
is exclusive. Hammond v. Johnson, supra; Adams
v. Portage Irr. Reservoir, & Power Co., supra:
Deseret Live Stock Co. v. Hooppiania, supra;
Bountiful City v. De L1lca, · 77 Utah 107, 292 P.
194; 72 A.L.R. 657. Although this statutory procedure has been amended at various times (see
Chap. 105, Laws of Utah 1935, Chap. 111, La,Ys
of Utah 1939) at all times since 1903 the statutory
procedure has required a filing of an application
with the State Engineer. The evidence fails to
show that this procedure was followed by these
defendants and their defense of valid appropriation must fail." (Wells ville East Field I rr. Co. t·.
Lindsay Land ~~ L. Co., 104 Utah ±48, 137 Pac.
(2nd) 634, 644)
3. ARGUMENT
(A) The waters on defendants' land in Sec. 9

and 22 trere not and are not subject to appropriation or prescriptive ,user.
The findings of the jury do not disclose the nature,
source, origin, kind or quantity of " . . ater " . .~ch plaintiff
and his witnesses assert exist and has existed upon
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defendant's lands in Sections 9 and 22, Twp. 2 S., Range
3 West, Salt Lake Base and ~Ieridian. The responses
by the jury to the interrogatories propounded to it
by the Court simply indicate the time element involved
in plaintiff's alleged use of the waters based on an
assumption that water in some a1nount existed on Sees.
9 and 22, during the duration of use. It is therefore
necessary to examine and consider the relevant evidence
in order to determine the necessary facts with respect
to said water.
Insofar as the defendant's evidence is concerned,
it denies the existence of water and "water holes" on
said lands (R. 136) and presents proof that at the most
there existed during certain seasons of certain years only
Hbogs" or "mud holes" located in certain sn1all restricted
areas (R. 177, 178, 179, 186). They were occasioned by
precipitation primarily and flow of melting snows and
probably by a small amount of percolating water in defendant's land which came to the surface and then gravitted to low places on said land (R. 137). The source of
this small amount of moisture is not directly disclosed
by the evidence. Defendant's evidence was corroborated
by that of the witnesses, Aldous, Palmer and Price, who
testified that there was a "bog" on Sec. 9, but no water
holes (R. 175, 177, 178, 179, 181, 241, 242).
Plaintiff's evidence in the main contradicts that of
of the defendant. Plaintiff and his witnesses testified as
to water and "water holes" but never mentioned the
source of the water. It is interesting to note that plaintiff's evidence during the course of trial became progressively more "moist" and "wetter." Cornmencing with
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plaintiff's own testimony in his case in chief-"1 he whole
place is not covered with water. There are holes ''Tatered.
Did you ever see a cow make a track * * *j' (R. 86).
"There is not enough water to flow away" (R. 87). (Plaintiff testified there existed a water hole in SE 1~ Sec. 9
Sec. 22) (R. 63, 64, 83, 84). He marked these alleged
holes on the map P Ex. 1 (R. 64). When plaintiff testified
on rebuttal, the one water hole in Sec. 9 became (R. 83)
fouT holes (R. 279) and they contained water during all
ruonths of the year and they always contained water
that cattle could and do use (R. 279, 280). Pierre Castagno produced sufficient water in these "holes" to
'vater 30 or 40 horses (R. 255). Tony Castagno asserted
that the "holes" never dried up and contained water
during all years at all times in sufficient amount to
\Vater cattle (R. 295). Rose Castagno asserted that the
'~holes" never dried up and there was water in them at
all times of drinkable quality (R. 304). Keith Wanless
called the water accumulations "spring holes" (R. 309).
lle said they contained "spring \Yater" not "run off"
\Vater (R. 316) but did not identify the source of the
w·ater. Cattle drank at the so-called ''holes" (R. 310).

The conflict in the evidence as to \Yhether \Yater
existed on the defendant's lands \Yas not resolved by
the jury. It ren1ains a question of fact for the fact
finder. If no water is found to exist then of course the
rlefendant is entitled to judg1nent on this issue. Ho\vever, defendant believes it expedient to present his argurnent on the assu1nption (and this is an assmnption in
favor of plaintiff and is 1nade for purposes of argument only) that sonle l. .~i,nd of \Yater and of son1e (but
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unknown amount has existed on Sees. 9 and 22 aforesaid.
Plaintiff's evidence identifies this water as either
(a) waste or seepage water, or (b) surface water, or
(c) percolating water. It is certainly not water flowing
in an established course. It is not water in a pond. It is
not water flowing directly from a spring. It is not
"live" water. It is not "natural" water. It possesses
certain elements of "surface" water and certain elements
of percolating water. Interpreting the evidence in a light
1nost favorable to plaintiff, the water appears to be
"dead" water representing moisture which has accumulated in low places on defendant's land during certain
periods of the year depending upon amount of natural
precipitation and seepage fron1 other areas.
The vvater thus identified and described by plaintiff
and his witnesses is exactly the type and kind of water
that is not and never has been subject either to formal
appropriation under the water laws nor subject to be
acquired by prescriptive user. The authorities cited above
from Utah and neighboring states without contradiction
declare this principle. Quoted authorities on irrigation
and water law, after defining waste or seepage water,
~urface and percolating water, unanimously declare that
the use thereof cannot be acquired by prescriptive user.
It is not the type or kind of water described in Sullivan
1JS. Northern Spy Mining Co., 11 Utah 438, 40 Pac. 709,
55 A.L.R. 1448, but rather it classifies under the heading
of percolating water "rising in the form of a bog or
utarsh" as was involved in Willow Creek Irri,gation Co.
v. Michaelssen, supra, or underground percolating 'vater
of Cresent Mining Co. vs. Silver King Mining Co., supra.
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Allowing the evidence in this case its maximum
thrust in favor of plaintiff, it falls far short of establishing and identifying the water on defendant's lands
as being water subject to appropriation or the use of
which may be obtained by prescription. Part of this
vvater was and is undoubtedly a component part of the
earth owned by defendant, percolating through defendant's soil and finally coming to the su~·face to forn1
bogs or marshes. It can be surmised that other parts
of it represent melting sno\v and rain ''Thich have
fallen on the surface of defendant's land and then
drained to low places on his land. _Plaintiff's evidence
does not even in1ply or suggest that any part of it
ca1ne from artesian wells driven by pi~intiff in Sees.
9 and 22. His evidence carefully eliminates this source
because they were driven only within the last t\vo or
three years.
In resolving the conflict in evidence the court n1ade
the following findings :

''19. A small but uncertain amount of \Yater
has accumulated during certain seasons of years
upon lands of defendant situated in Sections 9
and 22, Township 2, Range 5 East. Salt Lake Base
and Meridian, for 20 years prior to :Jiay 31~ 1955.
It has not been and is not \Yater of the type, kind
or quality that title thereto or use thereof can be
acquired by prescription, adverse possession or
adverse user, being either \Yaste \\~ater, surface
\\rater or pereolating \\Tater. Such \\Tater has accuinulated in lo\Y places consisting of s\\~ales and
1narsh)r arPas of tlu.•se seetions. It has ren1ained
in lo"· arPa8 and has not flo\\·ed out upon adjoinin~ land. ~luch of the \\·ater js surface \Yater
\\·hich "·as produced by rainfall and n1elting sno\YS.
-tS
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Its quantity has varied from year to year. During
dry seasons of the years and during years of small
or limited precipitation the small amount of water
in these low areas disappeared and the low areas
became mere bogs or mud holes. During certain
periods of the years when water accumulated in
these low places wandering cattle owned by plaintiff and others drank at these lo wplaces. Neither
plaintiff nor his predecessors in title and interest
have ever atternpted any appropriation of said
water under the statutes of the State of Utah.
This accurnulation of water does not originate or
flow from any natural water course nor has it
ever originated or flowed from any natural water
course. A small proportion of this water is probably water which percolates and has percolated
through the soil of defendant's lands and finally
came to the surface in the low areas described.
Said arnount of said water forms and has always
for1ned a part of the realty which has belonged
and now belongs to defendant. There is no kno\vn
and defined subterranean strearn on defendant's
land or in the vicinity thereof wherein this water
rnight originate."
The trial court found in favor of the defendant
on this aspect of the case. He is therefore entitled upon
appellate review to have the evidence and ever)T reasonable inference fairly to be drawn therefrom to be viewed
in the light rnost favorable to him. (Buehner Block Co.
vs. Glezos, 6 lTtah 2d 226, 310 P. 2d 517; Beck vs. J eppson, 1 lTtah 2d 127, 2()2 P. 2d 760.)
Furtherrnore, when the testimony is conflicting the
appellate court will not disturb the findings of the trial
court unless so manifestly erroneous as to den1onstrate
some oversight or rnistake affecting the substantial rights
of appellant. (Klopenstine vs. Hayes, 20 Utah 45, 57
-1:9
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Pac. 712; Singleton vs. K elly7 61 Utah 277, 212 Pac. 63,
66; Olivero v. Eleganti7 _ 61 Utah 475, 214 Pac. 313;
McMonegal vs. l!-yritsch Loan and Trust Co. 7 75 Utah 470,
268 Pac. 635.)
There is substantial evidence to sustain the foregoing findings. It was the duty of the trial court to
resolve the conflict, and having resolved the conflict in
defendant's favor, the rules cited above apply.
It is therefore the contention of defendant that
under the law and facts of this case that plaintiff did
not and could not acquire a prescriptive use of the
waters on defendant's land in Sees. 9 and 22 for the
reason that the proof shows they were either (a) waste
or seepage water, or (b) surface water, or (c) percolating water, or a combination of same. The law denies
that the use of such water may be obtained by prescription, because such water is 'ltot "water" of the type, nature
or kind subject to appropriation or prescriptive use.
(B)

In the alternative, if it be adjudged that the
waters on defendant's land in Sees. 9 and 22 have been
and are waters subject to the law of appropriation and
prescription, then plaintiff did not and could not acquire
a prescriptive use of sa1ne.
In the event the Court refuses to adopt defendant's
contention and theory above presented that the "\Yaters
on defendant's land ''Tere not and are not subject to
the law of appropriation and prescription and reaches
the conclusion that they 'rere and are "\raters subject
to appropriation and prescriptive user, then defendant
e1nphatically asserts that plaintiff, under the la"\v of
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l) tah, could not and did not acquire a prescriptive right

to use same.
Neither plaintiff nor defendant has n1ade any filing
111 the office of the State Engineer appropriating said
'vaters and neither of then1 have actually diverted said
'vaters from their natural collecting basins by means
of ditches, canals or other structures. Under this hypothesis the waters are public waters under the quoted
Constitutional provision, statutes and decisions of the
Utah Supreme Court. This court faces two alternatives:
~1) it 1nust declare that these waters are not "water"
under the water laws of Utah, but are waters of the
type and kind described in Willow Creek and Crescent
and not subject to appropriation or prescriptive user,
or (:2) it must declare these waters to be public waters
owned by the public. There is no other choice. The argunlent which follows is submitted on the assumption (and
"\Vithout de-emphasizing defendant's first contention and
line of defense) that the Court adopts the second alternative.
Defendant, in this brief, has summarized the history
of present Sec. 73-9-1, Utah Code Ann. 1953, from the
year 1903 to the present which is the vital and determinjng statutory enactment in this case. The original 1903
statute effective l\fay 11, 1903, during the passage of
the years has been amended and re-written many times,
but it has always retained either in form or substance
this vital mandate:
uRights to the use of any of the lUI a }JJJro pri-ated water iu the StatP JJI((.,l! ue acquired by ((j)jJropriation, in the JJutnuer hereiJiafter jJrovided,
and not otherwise."
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As the cited decisions of the Utah Supreme Court
disclose, this provision of law (and its ainendments and
amplifications) have been the subject of judicial construction with resultant legislative amendments. However, one clear certain fact shines through all of the
decisions (many of thern involving complicated and complex situations) and legislation, and that is that the
use of unappropriated public waters since May 11, 1903,
ean be acquired only through the methods prescribed by
the legislature "and not otherwise." As to these waters,
the acquisition of same by prescription has been outlawed since May 11, 1903.
The two decisions which announce this rule are
Jlooppiania and Hammond v. Johnson. There has never
been any deviation from the rule pronounced by then1
and the rule therein laid down has been a fixed, unquestioned rule in Utah since May 11, 1903. The controversy which arose in connection with the interpretation
of this statutory provision involved waters the use of
uJhich had passed from the public to private ou'nerslzip
and not as to waters which were ··public~· waters. The
final forrn of the statute as it appears as Sec. 73-3-1,
·utah Code Ann. 1953, represents the legislatiYe deterInination that even as to ··prirate 1rater .. there can be
no acquisition of use by prescription. All through the
years the dispute has never involved the rule of Hooppiania and Hanunond as applied to public "~aters, but
always as to \\~hether the statutory negation ··and not
otherwise" applied to \Yaters the use of "Thich had passed
froHl thP "publir." to "priYate o\\~nership. ·· ..._~n exainination and analysis of the cited decisions and of the many
5~
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authorities discussed and cited therein shows that the
Supreme Court persistently made the distinction herein
elucidated. It is in the cases where the use of water had
passed to private ownership that the Court refused to
apply what may be called the "not otherwise" rule
governing public waters and engaged in discussions
eoncerning the questions of abandonment, non-user, adverse user, forfeiture, interruption in usage and the
like questions. Lindsay graphically demonstrates the
distinction. In that case the irrigation company had
obtained a court decree fixing and determining the water
rights in Little Bear River. Lindsay and its predecessor
were not parties to the decree and continued to use
water from the river not decreed to them. The contest
\vas between private parties. Judge Larsen in Hammond
pointed up the distinction in his declaration:
"But neither abandonment nor forfeiture by
non-user takes cognizance of or applies to a
situation where a third party has entered the
scene." (66 Pac. (2nd) at 900)
Commencing with J\1arch 20, 1939, the Legislature applied the rule of Hooppiania and Hammond to private
'vaters. If there has been and there is water on defendant's said lands (an issue in this case) and the san1e
is not waste or seepage water, surface or percolating
'vater, then it always has been and is now "public water"
within Hooppiania and Hammond. On this hypothesis,
plaintiff never has acquired prescriptive use of sa1ne
because of the prohibition of the statute effective fron1
~lay 11, 1903, to the present date. If the date of filing
plaintiff's cross-complaint (Jan. 6, 1956) be taken, then
the elapsed time since May 11, 1903, is 52 years, 7
53
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rnonths and 25 days. If the date plaintiff commenced
r~his action (May 31, 1955) be taken then the elapsed
time is 52 years and 20 days. During all of this time
the 1903 statute and its amendments and amplifications
absolutely prohibited the plaintiff from acquiring the
right to the use of the water by prescription. The findings
of the jury is to the effect that plaintiff and his predecessors in ownership used said water holes for 50
consecutive years prior to May 31, 1955. Plaintiff and
his predecessors therefore commenced to use said water
on May 31, 1905, but at this time the 1903 statute was
operative as to this water, and forbade the initiation
of a period of prescriptive user. It is repeated that
neither plaintiff nor defendant has applied to the State
Engineer to appropriate said water, as mandated by
~tatute if rights to use same were to be acquired, nor
has any diversionary works been erected.
It is interesting to note that plaintiff's witness,
Pierre Castagne, is 50 years old (R. 246); that plaintiff's
"vitness, Tony Castagno, is 53 years old (R. 293); that
plaintiff's witness, Rose Castagno, fixed the years 19361937 as the time she first "helped ''ith live stock" in
connection with the Cassity-Castagno land (R. 301, 302,
:-303) ; that plaintiff's "\vitness, Wanless, first \Vorked for
plaintiff and on his land in 1941 (R. 308) ..A. s to Pierre
and Tony, 1nanifestly their n1e1nories at the maximum
cannot go back for n1ore than 40 or 45 years. As to
l~ose, her testin1ony would encon1pass a period of 20
years at the maxiinuin. As to Wanless, 15 years only
are within his me1nory. The plaintiff, himself~ was vague
and gave no date as to com1nence1nent of use of the
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\Vaters. He stated that "cattle drank at the holes as
long as he can remember." (R. 65). Manifestly this testiInony does not prove any use prior to lVfay 11, 1903 (R.
89). It is directed to the time subsequent to said dateall within the interdicted period. The jury's finding
that plaintiff and his predecessors used said water holes
for 50 consecutive years prior to lVfay 31, 1955, means
exactly what it says. The underlying evidence would not
support a finding of usage prior to May 31, 1905.
Under this state of the law and the facts, defendant
contends and submits, that plaintiff obtained no prescriptive right to use these waters. It becomes entirely immaterial as to when the defendant's lands passed fron1
ownership of the United States to private ownership.
The doctrine of Sullivan v. Northern Spy Mining Co.,
supra, as recognized by the Act of Congress of July 26,
1866 ( 43 U.S.C.A. 661) is to the effect that
"To initiate and acquire a right in and to
the use of unappropriated public \Vater, "rhether
on the public domain or '.vithin a reservation or
elsewhere, is dependent upon the la'.vs or custon1s
of the state in which the water is found." (Sew-ards v. 111 ea9hcr, 37 t:tah 212, 108 Pac. 212)
governs the situation as disclosed by the evidence in
this case. Under the lavv of the State of Utah, plaintiff
could acquire by prescription no rights in the \Yater
on defendant's land.
With the disappearance of plaintiff's alleged rights
in the water there also disappears any rights of ingress
or egress for its enjoyment. Such implied easement
1nust find its existence in the right to the water and
\vhen no right to the water exists there is no easement
(Wendler v. Woodward, 93 Wash. 684; 161 Pac. 1043).
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PARTB
ANALY'SIS OF APPELLANT'S

OF ERRORS IN ARGUMENTS
LEGAL AUTHORITIES AND DEMONSTRATION
POINTS I AND II. It is respectfully submitted
that Respondent in Part A - Respondent's Argument
and Demonstration of Validity of Judgment- has fully
demonstrated the validity of the judgment in this case
in his favor and has thereby shown to the Court that
Appellant's argun1ents in support of these points in his
brief are unsound and not supported by either the law
or the facts in this case. It is believed that there is no
necessity of further comment on these points.
POINT III covers rulings of the trial Court in the
exclusion of evidence. Each ruling will be treated separately.
1. The excluded evidence pertained to a supposed
right to trail cattle fron1 an area marked on P Ex. I in
pink bearing the figure ~'3" to the ""old homestead" being
shown on said exhibit in pink and n1arked 'Yith the figure
"2." In none of Plaintiff's pleadings did he allege any
such trail "\vay easement. The basis of his claim for
such easement related only to trailing cattle to and fron1
Stansbury Island (R. 258, 259, 260, 263). Plaintiff's allegations in paragraph 1 of his first separate defense
(Record of Appeal, Plaintiff's . .~ns,Yer to Defendant's
cross clailns) are definitely tied to the so-called Stansbury Island "trail"~ay." The atte1npted production of
this evidence at the trial "\Yas a surprise to Respondent
as there was no "\Yarning pleading of any such claim.
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l_"'he Court properly struck such evidence (R. 263).
2. Appellant propounded this question to the Witness Pierre Castagno:
"Do you have an opinion, Pierre, as to how
the quantity of forage consu1ned and trampled
down, by 1naking this trail use of your brother
(Respondent) would compare to the quantity of
forage which his land about which you have just
testified~ ( R. 269).
In explanation of this question Appellant's counsel said:
"I believe it shows he n1ade use of these
lands for the period which we are here involved
with a certain number of head of cattle and a
certain vvay. What I a1n trying to show is how
that use compares to the total quantity of forage
which is supported or produced by the lands, he,
himself, owns within this very area." (R. 270).
The "he" referred to in the explanation is the Respondent,
Castagno (R. 270). The Court then asked: '"Are you
trying to compare damages now}" (R. 270). Appellant's
counsel responded: "It would have that result, yes."
( R. 270). The Court sustained Respondent's objection
to this question. The ruling was proper as the answer
of this witness to this question would in no sense bear
on the question of damages accruing to the Respondent
by virtue of the Appellant using Respondent's ]and as
a trailway. The comparison between the amount of forage
consumed by Appellant's cattle on Respondent's lands
and the total amount the land would produce is not the
correct measure of da1nages for the trespass (52 AllL J ur.
-Trespass-Sec. 49, pp. 873-875).
3. The excluded testimony pertained to an alleged
conversation between Appellant and Appellant's deceased
;)7
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father-in-law relative to the quantity and quality of
water in the so-called "water holes" (R. 278, 279). The
testimony was hear say. (Jones on Evidence (Ed. De
Luxe) Sec. 297; Wigmore's Code of Evidence, Rule 147,
P. 259).

4. This action \vas tried in January, 1957. Appellant's counsel propounded this question to Appellant:
"Have you seen cattle watering in thi'S dry year?" (Emphasis supplied). The answer was "Yes." The complaint
in this action was filed on May 31, 1955. Upon motion
of Respondent the Court struck Appellant's ans\Yer.
'l,hereupon Appellant was asked by his counsel: "Is this
as dry a year as during any of the years prior to 1955 ?"
(R. 282). The witness answered: "Yes." He was then
asked: "Is it drier~" Objection \vas sustained. The Court
'vas correct in its ruling. The condition in 1957 - ''This
year" (which was subsequent to the conn11encement of
the action) was not a proper reference base upon which
to draw an inference as to prior conditions.
5.
error:

The following excerpt applies to this alleged

"Q. Do you know, ~Ir. Cassity, approximately when the hon1estead \Yas filed by ~Ir.
Castagno on the lands 1narked 'Yith a "nu1neral
2~"

"THE COURT: Hasn't that been stipulated~
"1\IR. OMAN: As to the date the patent \Yas
issued, but not the date he filed it.
"1\[R,. RITER: That is in1n1aterial, and I object to it.
"THE COl TRT: Do yon object on the ground
that it's not the best evidence~
"l\ rR. RITER: Yes.
"THE COURT: The objection is sustained.''
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It requires no citation of authorities to show that Appellant could not prove matters pertaining to the homestead
application of Castagno by mere oral statements of
Cassity as to date of filing of the ho1nestead application
by Castagno in the Federal General Land Office. No
foundation was laid for the admission of this secondary
evidence. If relevant and rna terial to the issues in this
case there was a way of proving such facts, but not by
the method followed by Appellant in this instance. The
best evidence rule clearly forbids such method of proof.
rrhere was no error.
6. This alleged error in exclusion of evidence will
be discussed hereafter in connection with the discussion
of Point V of Appellant's brief.
POINT IV. Through clerical error the Findings
of Fact and the Judgment erroneously attributed to
the Respondent ownership of the following land:
NW 14NE1;4; NE14N\V1;4; SW~NvV14 and vV:lf2SW~, Twp
2South, Range 5 West, Salt Lake
Base and l\feridian.
This land in truth is owned by Appellant .. The ownership paragraph of Finding 3 and Paragraph 7 (A) of
the Judgment should be corrected by eliminating said
lands froin an adjudication of Respondent's ownership.
POINT V. Appellant asserts that a "promissory
estoppel" exists as against Respondent as a justification
of Appellant over running Respondent's land with cattle
owned by Appellant. This claim is based on fragmentary
evidence given by the Respondent on a Rule 43 (b)
examination at the trial (R. 10, 11). Appellant's pleadjngs in this case raise no such issue. Neither in his
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original complaint nor in his supplemental complaint
did he make allegations that his alleged right to trail
cattle over Respondent's land was based on conduct
of Respondent which created an estoppel.
"In pleading an estoppel in pais, the rule
prevails that the plea must be certain in every
particular, and must allege every material fact
which the pleader expects to prove or upon which
the estoppel is predicated. The estoppel must be
pleaded with the same fullness and particularity
as are required in cases involving like subjects of
inquiry in suits in equity." 19 Am. J ur. Estoppel
Sec. 193." (Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms
-Estoppel, Vol. 8, P. 181).
Under this argument, estoppel - whether it be in pais
or a so-called "promissory estoppel - is "an element
oi the cause of action." It must be pleaded. (Berow etal
~us. Shields et ux, 48 Utah 270, 159 Pac. 538; Barber vs.
Anderson, 73 Utah, 375 274 Pac. 136; Annotation 120
ALR 105). Respondent again invites the Court's attention to the fact that Appellant's case, as based on his
pleadings, is based solely on the clailn of prescriptive
user. The trial court properly struck the evidence relating
to an alleged transaction pertaining to the ''hon1estead"
land of Respondent (R. 11) in vie"\Y of the state of the
pleadings. However, it should be noted that . .\.ppellant's
counsel did not at the ti1ne of the trial clann it supported
the clain1 of an estoppel. He asserted ''* * * but now he
(Castagno) has refused to sell that out, because of things
which have transpired bet,veen the parties here, and
he has co1ne to interfere "\Yith this operation of Cassity.
I claim that actually-." For the foregoing reason, the
Court was correct in striking the evidence pertaining
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to an alleged agreement of the Respondent to sell Appellant the '~ho1nestead" land (R. 10, 11). (See also Point
II, 5 of Appellant's brief at page 28), and in not allowing
Appellant's counsel to pursue such line of questioning.
It will be noted that Respondent acted promptly to
eliminate testimony on this point as soon as it became
apparent the purpose thereof (R. 10, 11).
CONCLUSION
The vein of thought runs through Appellant's brief
that his claimed necessity of using Respondent's land
for the operation of his live stock business, gives him
some kind of legal right to subordinate it to his use and
convenience regardless of the rights of Respondent.
The judgment in this case denies such philosophy. It
upholds the doctrine that each man should use his own
property in such manner as not to injure his neighbor.
'rhe judgment should be affirmed, except to the correction of the clerical error above noted.
Respectfully submitted,
FRANKLIN RITER

Attorney for Respondent
Suite 312 Kearns Bldg.,
Salt Lake City, 1Jtah
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